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to have been the intention of the Court in this case to re-
move any discrepancies between state and federal court pro-
cedural rights to counsel, as was done regarding illegal search
and seizure in Mapp v. Ohio. 21 What the minimum charges




CRIMINAL LAW-ALIBI-AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN IOWA-
The defendant was indicted for second degree murder.
Under Iowa's disclosure Statute1 defendant gave notice of
his intention to, plead alibi. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme
Court held, three judges dissenting, that the trial court prop-
erly instructed the jury that the defendant was under a burden
to establish his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence;
yet, if the evidence as a whole left a reasonable doubt of
guilt, the jury must acquit. The dissent argued that this
instruction was contradictory, and that it denied the defend-
ant his presumption of innocence by making him prove his
non-presence. State v. Stump, 119 N. W. 2d 210 (Iowa 1963).
Iowa's stringent alibi rules have been severly criticized,
2
even though the state claims all the common safeguards of
"reasonable doubt" in its criminal prosecutions. 3 If the
accused pleads not guilty, he denies that he participated in
the commission of the crime, and he need only raise a reason-
able doubt of this fact.4  But if he goes further and says
that he was so far away that he could not possibly have
committed the crime, he must prove it by a preponderance
of the evidence,5 in order to be acquitted on that ground
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. In another recent decision, Douglas v. People of State of California.
83 Sup. Ct. 814 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that an in-
digent defenant charged and convicted of a felony had a right to a court-
appointed counsel for an appeal.
1. Iowa Code Ann., tit. 36, § 777.18 (1962). "Where the defendant
pleads not guilty and proposes to show insanity as a defense, or that he
relies on an alibi or that he was at some other place at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense charged, he shall, at the time he pleads
or at any time thereafter, not later than four days before the trial, file a
written notice of this purpose. See State v. Rourick, 245 Iowa 319.
60 N.W.2d 529 (1953).
2. See State v. Reed, 62 Iowa 40, 17 N.W. 150 (1883); State v. Hamil-
ton, 57 Iowa 596. 11 N.W. 5 (1881). See also 27 Mich. L. Rev. 702 (1929).
3. State v. Red, 207 Iowa 69, 151 N.W. 831, 832 (1880).
4. State v. Bosworth, 170 Iowa 329, 151 N.W. 581, 586 (1915).
5. ]bl!d.
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alone.6 Iowa regards this type of evidence, known as alibi 7
with suspicion. 8 Iowa courts may disparage such evidence
by instructing that it is easily fabricated. 9 In making alibi
an affirmative defense ° the Iowa decisions imply that the
state need not prove the defendant's presence beyond a
reasonable doubt if he claims to have been elsewhere, while
nonetheless denying this logical conclusion.- When the alibi
evidence does no more than raise a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, the jury may
convict or acquit by choosing between two contradictory in-
structions. No jury may follow both.12  Trial courts have
often recognized this anomaly, and have given more liberal
instructions.1
3
The majority of jurisdictions, however, hold that the
defendant need prove nothing, and that the state must prove
the presence of the accused at the time and place of the
commission of the crime.' It is sufficient to warrant ac-
quittal if the alibi evidence merely raises a reasonable doubt
of guilt. 5 It has been called "the most effective of the
exculpatory defenses,"'l6 yet is not a defense at all. 1 7 Analy-
tically, it is a plea of not guilty, with a rebuttal of the
essential element of the defendant's presence at the scene
of the crime. 18 It naturally follows that all the evidence
introduced to show that the accused was elsewhere tends in
the same degree to show that he was not at the scene of
6. State v. Debner, 205 Iowa 25, 215 N.W. 721, 722 (1927).
7. See State v. Glass, 29 N.D. 620, 151 N.W. 229, 234 (1915).
8. State v. Banoch, 193 Iowa 851, 186 N.W. 436 (1922); State v. Blunt.
59 Iowa 468, 13 N.W. 427 (1882).
9. State v. Blunt, 59 Iowa 468, 13 N.W. 427 (1882). But the court may
not single out the testimony of a particular alibi witness and cast sus-
picion on it. State v. Boyd, 196 Iowa 226, 194 N.W. 177, 178 (1923).
10. State v. McCumber, 202 Iowa 1382, 212 N.W. 137 (1927 .
11. State v. Red, 207 Iowa 69, 4 N.W. 831 (1880).
12. See State v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa 596, 11 N.W. 5 (1881) (dissenting
opinion of Adams, C. J.).
13. See State v. Thomas, 135 Iowa 717, 109 N.W. 900, 902 (1906) "The
jury was told to acquit if the evidence as to alibi 'raises a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's presence at the time and place of the com-
mission of the crime.' The instruction was more favorable to defendant
than it should have been." See also State v. Hassan, 149 Iowa 518. 128
N.W. 960, 965, 966 (1910).
14. E.g., Newton v. State, 229 Miss. 267, 90 So. 2d 375 (1956); State v.
Bridgers, 233 N.C. 577, 64 S.E.2d 867 (1951); Roen v. State, 182 Wis. 515.
196 N.W. 825 (1924).
15. People v. Roberts, 122 Cal. 377, 55 Pac. 137 (1898); People v. Silver-
man, 252 App. Div. 149, 297 N.Y. Supp. 449 (1937).
16. 2 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 440 (5th ed. 1959).
17. See State v. Brauneis, 84 Conn. 222, 79 AtI. 70 (1911); Peyton v. State.
54 Neb. 188, 74 N.W. 597 (1898). See also 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 121 (1957).
18. See State v. Schweitzer, 17 Conn. 532, 18 AtI. 787 (1889). See also 1
WHARTON. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 23 (12th ed. 1955).
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the crime when committed. Alibi evidence differs from an
affirmative defense such as insanity by attempting to cast
doubt on the defendant's presence rather than to escape
criminal liability. 19 A defendant is presumed to have been
sane, but he cannot be presumed to have been present with-
out denying him his presumption of innocence. While some
courts have held that the burden of proof is upon the de-
fendant with respect to alibi,2 0 this has usually meant the
burden of introducing evidence in its support.2
1
North Dakota is among the most liberal jurisdictions on
the matter of alibi." It has no disclosure statute, and has




DAMAGES-INJURIES TO THE PERSON-IMPAIRMENT OF
EARNING CAPACITY-COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE-Plaintiffs,
members of the U. S. Air Force, were involved in an
automobile accident and brought suit to recover damages
for personal injuries. The Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire, in a unanimous decision, held that plaintiffs were en-
titled to recover for loss of earning capacity even though
they continued to receive their pay. from the government
during the period of disability. Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H.
227, 183 A.2d 729 (1962).
The measure of damages in personal injury cases may
be stated generally as that amount which will compensate
for all the dletriment proximately caused by the wrongful act
or breach of duty.' Specifically, in actions of tort for per-
sonal injuries, damages are recoverable for loss of capacity
19. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence § 153 (1939).
20. People v. Weiss, 367 Ill. 580, 12 N.E.2d 652 (1937); Commonwealth
v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 (1870).
21. State v. Brauneis, 84 Conn. 222, 79 Atl. 70 (1911); State v. Thornton,
10 S.D. 349, 73 N.W. 196 (1897).
22. A recent example of the liberality on alibi in North Dakota courts
is found in State v. MacDonald (N.D. Dist. 1963) in which Redetzke J.
instructed, "It is sufficient to justify an acquittal if the evidence on that
point raises a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the accused at the
time and place of the commission of the crime."
23. See State v. Gates, 51 N.D. 695, 200 N.W. 778 (1924).
1. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03-20 (1961).
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